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I. I N T R O D U C T I O N 
IN EVERY developed legal system, cross-claims existing reciprocally between two 
parties may be set off against each other through unilateral declaration, judicial 
order or ex lege effect.1 Until recently,2 this institution has not received particular 
doctrinal attention in the context of international economic arbitration. While 
most arbitration rules contain provisions on counterclaims, only some of them 
deal with set-off3 even though both institutions bear a striking resemblance.4 
Arbitration laws rarely contain rules on set-off.-5 In the travaux preparatoires for 
the new German Arbitration Act that entered into force on 1 January 1998, the 
German legislature has stated that 'issues that due to their complexity do not lend 
themselves for statutory regulation [in an arbitration act], such as multiparty 
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1
 See ICC Award No. 3540, reprinted in Collection of ICC Arbitral Awards (eds. Jarvin and Derains) (1974-
1985, 1990) at pp. 105, 112 (English translation) and pp. 399, 403 (French original); ICC Award No. 5971 
in (1995) 13 ASA Bulletin at p. 728; Derham, Set-Oft (1996, 2nd ed.) at p. 1, emphasizing that set-off 
should not be confused with situations in which, in tfie absence of any cross-demand, the damages payable 
by the respondent may be reduced due to a benefit incidentally accruing to the claimant as a result of the 
respondent's breach; cf. also for a case of automatic deduction under common law Lord Mansfield in Dale 
v. Sollet [1767] 4 Burr. 2133; see for this important differentiation under German law Berger, Der 
Aufrechnungsvertrag (1996) at pp. 190 ef seq. 
2
 See for recent comments on 'set-off and arbitration' Poudret, 'Compensation et Arbitrage' in Le Droit en 
Action (eds Rapp and Jaccard) (Lausanne 1996) at p. 361; Reiner, 'Aufrechnung trotz (Fehlens einer) 
Schiedsvereinbarung nach osterreichischem Recht' in Festschrift Karl Hempel (Vienna 1997) at p. 108; 
Bonzanigo, 'II nuovo regolamento di arbitrato di Lugano: presentazione e temi scelti' in II Tekken e il 
Diorite (eds Caimi, Cometta, Corti) (1997) at pp. 93, 106 ef seq. 
3
 See Article 19(3) UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules; Article 30(5) ICC Rules of Arbitration in force as of 1 
January 1998 (ICC Publication No. 581); Article 42(c) WIPO Arbitration rales; Article 27 International 
Arbitration Rules of the Zurich Chamber of Commerce, see infra V(b)(iii). 
4
 See infra III. 
'' See for a discussion of Article 29 of the Swiss Concordat infra V(b)(i). 
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arbitration or set-off, have not been dealt with in the new law'.6 During the 
deliberations of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial 
Arbitration, the Czechoslovakian delegation suggested a provision stating that until 
the end of the hearing, the tribunal would have the right 'to conduct proceedings 
also on counterclaims . . . and on claims presented as set-offs in the form of a 
defence'.7 This proposal did not receive further consideration. The Working 
Group assumed that provisions dealing with counterclaims8 'would apply [mutatis 
mutandis\ to a claim relied on by the respondent for the purpose of a set-off'.9 
The reason why arbitral institutions, domestic legislatures and the UNCITRAL 
Working Group alike are reluctant to deal with set-off in the context of 
international arbitration is rooted in the particular nature of this legal institution. 
Set-off may have a substantive or procedural nature, depending on the applicable 
law. Even within a given legal system, there may be different types of set-off, having 
either a procedural or a substantive nature. Domestic laws may also impose quite 
distinct requirements on the effectiveness of this defence. The complexity of the 
subject has led to the conclusion that even today, set-off is 'an institution which 
does not seem to have revealed all its mysteries'.10 In the context of international 
arbitration, additional intricate problems may arise when the cross-claim is not 
subject to the same arbitration clause. Also, the cost aspect may add a particular 
coloration to the problem. For all of these reasons, arbitral institutions, domestic 
legislatures and the UNCITRAL Working Group, eager to ensure the 'user-
friendliness' of their respective rules by ensuring a minimum of interference with 
domestic laws, have refrained from tackling the issue of set-off in international 
economic arbitration, where aspects of procedural and substantive law are 
inextricably intertwined. 
This regulatory sparseness and the substantive and procedural intricacies of set-
off make it all the more important that international arbitrators have a fixed arsenal 
of generally accepted principles relating to the historical background, to the 
relationship between set-off and counterclaim, to conflict of laws issues, to the pro-
cedural admissibility of the plea in the arbitration and to the costs of set-off.11 
' 'Bericht mit einem Diskussionsentwurf zur Neufassung des Zehnten Buches der ZPO' (1994) at p. 14 
(emphasis added) (ed. Kommission zur Neuordnung des Schiedsverfahrensrechts). 
7
 UN Doc. A/CN.9/263 (19 March 1985), 'C. Comments on additional points', No. 3. 
Article 2(0 concerning the analogous application of provisions dealing with 'a claim' to 'a counter-claim' was 
inserted into the Model Law at the last minute of the deliberations in the UNCITRAL Working Group, see 
the Commission Report UN Doc. A/40/17 (21 August 1985), No. 327; cf. a/so infra III. 
9
 UN Doc. A/CN.9/264 (25 March 1985), Article 23, No. 7 in Fine. 
10
 Ndoko, 'Les mysteres de la compensation' in (1991) Rev. dr. civ. at p. 661. 
See Mustill and Boyd, Commercial Arbitration (1989, 2nd ed.) at p. 129, stating that the co-existence of 
asserted claims, set-offs and counterclaims may give rise to difficult theoretical and practical problems 'upon 
which the reported cases give little guidance'. 
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II. T H E HISTORICAL D E V E L O P M E N T OF SET-OFF 
In the field of set-off more than in others, the historical perspective helps to 
understand the different concepts of set-off that exist in the various jurisdictions. 
(a) Set-Off in Roman Law 
The origins of the law of set-off can be traced back to ancient Roman law. The 
initial strong legal and procedural formalism of classical Roman law forbade any 
set-off even of claims stemming from the same contract. Instead, it required the 
specific performance of any obligation until a rescript of Emperor Marcus 
Aurelius (161-180) granted the plea of 'exceptio dol? when the claimant refused 
to deduct from his claim the amount of a claim that the respondent had against 
him. From then on, the right of set-off was no longer limited to actions in equity 
('bonae fidei iudiciis'), in which the respondent could raise the plea of set-off when 
his claim arose out of the same contract ('eadem causa'). It was also granted in 
actions of strict law ('iudicia stricti iuris') and irrespective of whether the claims 
were born out of the same contract.12 Later, the Emperor Justinian ordered that 
the plea of set-oft was to be applied to all actions, irrespective of their procedural 
or substantive qualification.13 
(b) Set-Off in Civil Law 
The recognition of set-off as a generally acknowledged remedy of Roman law was 
the basis for the development of set-off as a legal principle in civil law jurisdictions 
('Aufrechnung', 'Verrechnung", 'compensation', 'verrekening", 'compensacion', 
' compensazione') .14 The long-standing dispute whether set-off is of a procedural 
or substantive law nature was finally decided in favour of the latter view.15 It was 
argued diat whenever equity ('aequitas', 'Billigkeif) requires the setting-off of 
mutual claims, set-off through unilateral extra-judicial declaration by one of the 
parties should be allowed.16 In the jurisdictions of the formerly communist 
countries as well, the 'remarkable development of this legal institution and of its 
' 'Sed et in strictis iudiciis ex rescripto divi Marci opposite doli mali exceptione compensatio inducebatur', cf. 
Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations, Roman Foundations of the Civilian Tradition (1990) at p. 761. 
L
 cf. Appleton, Histoire de la Compensation en Droit Romain (189.5) at p. 769; Zimmerman, op. cit. at pp. 
766 et seq.; Dullinger, Handbuch der Aufrechnung (1995) at p. 148. 
14
 cf. for French law Articles 1289 et seq. Code Civil ('compensation legale'); for Dutch law Articles 6:127 et 
seq. Dutch Civil Code (Burgerlijk Wetboek); for Spanish law Articles 1195 Codigo Civil; for Swiss law 
Articles 120 et seq. of the Swiss Law of Obligations and Article 148(3) of die Swiss Federal Law on Private 
International Law; for Italian law Article 1241 Codice Civile; cf. also Articles 1672 et seq. Code Civil du 
Quebec; s. 432 of the Civil Code of the former German Democratic Republic; see for American law 
Edmonds v. Stratton, Mo.App. 457 SW 2d 228 at 232 and s. 2-717 UCC; cf. also the survey by Wild, Die 
Verrechnung im internationalen Privatrecht (1992) at pp. 86 et seq.; cf. generally the survey by Wood, 
English and International Set-Off (1989) Nos. 24-1 et seq. 
1,5
 See J. Goldschmidt in (1899) 15 Archiv fur Biirgerliches Recht at pp. 153, 156, n. 3: 'The question whemer 
set-off may be effected through a unilateral, extra-judicial declaration belongs to the most controversial 
issues' (translation by the audior). 
16
 See Kohler, '{Compensation und Prozess' in (1894) 20 Zeitschrift fur Zivilprozeft at pp. 1, 11. 
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place in the legal regulation of international economic relations' was acknowledged 
and work towards unification of the law of set-off was commenced within the Council 
for Mutual Economic Cooperation.17 Today, the new Civil Code of the Russian 
Federation has incorporated the remedy of set-off in Articles 410 et seq. 
There was, however, one important difference in the development of the law of 
set-off in civil law jurisdictions. In some countries such as France (for the 
'compensation legale' under Articles 1289 er seq. of the Code Civil),l% Belgium 
and Spain, the setting-off of two claims is effected ipso iure, without any 
declaration by one of the parties, while in others such as Germany, the 
Netherlands, Switzerland, Japan, Korea and the Scandinavian countries, set-off 
always requires a declaration by one of the parties. This difference in construction 
is mitigated by the fact that, even where the set-off is effected ipso iure, the debtor 
has to invoke the set-off in order to make it relevant for the judge.19 Still, the 
question as to the ipso iure effect of set-off has led to considerable confusion. In 
some jurisdictions, such as South Africa, the issue whether set-off has an ipso iure 
effect or requires a declaration by one of the parties is still disputed today.20 In 
Austria, the legislature assumed an ipso iure effect of the set-off provisions of the 
Austrian Civil Code. However, since this legislative intent was not clearly ex-
pressed in the law itself, Austrian doctrine today requires a declaration of set-off by 
the debtor. It is an unfortunate development of the law that the assumption of an 
ipso iure effect of set-off, which divides the civil law jurisdictions, was in fact the 
result of a misconception of the Roman principle 'compensato Htipso iure' rather 
than of a coherent legal evolution.21 
(c) Set-Off in Common Law 
The equitable character of set-off was the starting point for the development of 
set-off in common law. The plea of set-off was first granted as 'equitable set-off 
of claims flowing out of the same or closely related transactions by the courts 
17
 Strohbach, in 'Grundziige einer wissenschaftlichen Konzeption des allgemeinen Teils der rechdichen 
Regelung internationaler Wirtschaftsvertrage zwischen den Organisationen der Mitgliedslander des RGW 
(ed. Akademie fur Staats- und Rechtswissenschaften der DDR) (1986) at pp. 55, .56. 
18
 See Article 1290 Code Civil: 'La compensation s'opere de plein droit par la seule force de la loi ...'. 
19
 See for French law Terre, Siruler and Lequette, Droit Civil (1993, 5th ed.) at p. 984, hinting at the principle 
of French procedural law contained in Article 7 of the Nouveau Code de Procedure Civil according to 
which the judge 'ne pent pas fonder sa decision sur les faits qui ne sont pas dans le debat; see also 
Schlosser, Das Recht der internationalen privaten Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit (1989, 2nd ed.) No. 399. 
Zimmermann, supra n. 12, at p. 761. 
21
 See E. Bucher, 'Rechtsvergleichende und kollisionsrechdiche Bemerkungen zur Verrechnung (Kompensa-
tion)' in Melanges en L'Honneur d' Alfred E. von Overbeck (1990) at pp. 701, 706; cf. also Zimmerman, 
supra n. 12, at p. 767; in fact, the ipso iure effect of set-off was introduced dirough an error of the Glossator 
Martinus (Martinus, Glossa ad c.4 c.h.t. de compens. 4, 31; ad § 30 i. de act. 4, 6; but see Glossator Azo, 
Summa Azonis h.t. § 13) that found its way into various domestic laws; see Crome, System des deutschen 
Burgerlichen Rechts, Vol. 2 (1902) at p. 288, n. 7. 
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of equity,22 while the common law courts adhered to the concept of abatement23 or 
recoupment.24 Later, set-off was allowed at law in England under Statutes of Set-off 
enacted in 1729 and 1735.25 Today, the distinction between equitable set-off and 
set-off at law is said to be blurred.26 However, like the 'compensation legale' and 
'compensation judiciaire' of French law, the two institutions have to be 
distinguished in terms of both prerequisites and legal nature. 
The 'independent' set-off at law under the Statutes just mentioned is available 
only for mutual debts which are capable of being liquidated or ascertained with 
precision, including liquidated damages, e.g. those arising out of a liquidated 
damages clause.27 This type of set-off does not require any relation between the 
transactions out of which the claims arise.28 Set-off at law is a purely procedural 
defence, i.e. a procedure for taking an account of the balance due between the 
parties.29 There is thus no set-off at law without legal proceedings.30 Even when 
invoked by the respondent during the proceedings, claim and cross-claim as two 
separate and distinct debts remain in existence until there is a judgment for a set-
off. Consequendy, set-off at law cannot be invoked unilaterally by one of the 
See Rawson v. Samuel [1841] Cr.&Ph. 161; Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1873, s. 24; Supreme Court 
of Judicature Consolidation Act 1925, ss. 38, 41; Supreme Court Act 1981, s. 49; cf. also Chitty on 
Contracts (1994, 27th ed.) No. 28-090 in tine; Derham, supra n. 1, at pp. 40 er seq. 
23
 The plea of abatement was developed as a substantive defence of common law leading to the deduction of 
the plaintiffs claim primarily in sales and labour contracts, Mondelv. Steel, [1835-42] Al! ER 511; Aries 
Tanker Corporation v. Total Transport Ltd [1977] 1 All ER 398; cf. also English Sale of Goods Act 1979, 
s. 53(l)(a). 
The defence of recoupment allowed the defendant to show, for the purpose of reducing or defeating the 
plaintiffs recovery, some facts arising out of the transaction sued upon which would have founded an 
independent action in the defendant's favour, Pennsylvania RR v. Miller [1941] 124 F. 2d 160; see James 
and Hazard, Civil Procedure (1977, 2nd ed.), § 10.14; Waterman, Set-off, Recoupment and Counterclaim 
(1872, 2nded.) §§302 et seq. 
25
 (1729) 2 Geo. II c. 22 s. 13; (1735) 8 Geo. II c. 24 s. 5; repeal of these Statutes by the Civil Procedure Acts 
Repeal Act of 1879 did not affect the right of set-off conferred by these Statutes, cf. Hanak v. Green [1958] 
2 QB 9 at 22; see generally Rosenberg, Weinstein, Smit and Korn, Elements of Civil Procedure (1976, 3rd 
ed.) at p. 427; Derham, supra n. 1, at pp. 9 et seq. 
26
 Se.e Clark and Surbeck, 'The Pleading of Counter-Claims' in (1928) 37 Yale LJ at pp. 300 et seq.; Wood, 
supra n. 14, No. 1-12; British Anzani (Felixstowe) Ltd v. International Marine Management (UK) Ltd 
11979] 2 All ER 2163; Federal Commerce & Navigation Co. Ltdv. Molena Alpha Inc. (The Nanfri) [1978] 
3 All ER 1066 at 1078 (CA); Hahib Bank Ltd v. Habib Bank AG 11981] 1 WLR 1265; cf. also Curson v. 
Arican Co. [1683] 1 Vern. 121; Chapman v. Tanner [16841 1 Vern. 267, 23 ER 461; Chapman v. Derby 
[1689] 2 Vern. 117, 23 ER 684; Peters v. Soame [1701] 2 Vern. 428, 23 ER 874; Lord Lanesborough v. 
Jones [1716] 1 P Wms 325, 24 ER 409; Green v. Farmer [1768] 4 Burr. 2214, 98 ER 154; cf. generally 
McCracken, The Banker's Remedy of Set-Off' (1993) at pp. 48 et seq.; Kegel, Probleme der Aufrechnung 
(1938) at pp. 11 er seq.; Eujen, Die Aufrechnung im internationalen Verkehr zwischen Deutschland, 
Frankreich und England (1975) at pp. 20 et seq. 
27
 Stooke v. Taylor 11880] 5 QB 569; Aectra Refining and Marketing Inc. v. Exmar NV (The 'New 
Vanguard') [1995] Lloyd's Rep. 191 at 192; Derham, supra n. 1, at p. 13. 
28
 The 'New Vanguard', ibid, at p. 200; In re Daintry [19001 1 QB 546; Derham, supra n. 1, at p. 319. 
29
 The 'New Vanguard', ibid, at p. 200. 
30
 See Talbot v. Frere [18781 9 Ch.D. 568 at 573: ".. . There could not be a set-off until action brought and 
set-off pleaded'. 
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parties outside judicial or arbitral proceedings.31 Equitable or 'transaction'32 set-off, 
on the other hand, operates as a true, substantive defence against the respondent's 
liability to pay a debt otherwise due. It may be invoked independently of any order 
of a court or arbitral tribunal.33 Also, the cross-claim, whether contractual or 
tortious, need not arise out of the same contract as the claim, provided that 'it is 
inseparably connected with the transaction giving rise to the claim so that the tide 
of the plaintiff at law to prosecute his demand is impeached'.34 Opinions are still 
divided whether, similarly to the German, Swiss or Dutch notion of set-off, 
equitable set-off requires the debtor to 'exercise' or 'declare' the set-off or whether 
the claims remain in existence between the parties, irrespective of the debtor 
invoking the set-off, until extinguished by judgment or agreement.3-5 
III. S E T - O F F A N D COUNTERCLAIM 
When claims of money are at stake, which usually is the case in international 
economic arbitration, set-off and counterclaim are 'only a hair's-breadth away'36 
from each other. Both may be based on the same factual pattern, the co-existence 
of asserted claims between the parties. It is for this reason that a party invoking a 
set-off in an ICC-arbitration will have to pay an advance on costs as if it had raised a 
separate claim or counterclaim.37 Set-off in international economic arbitration is 
therefore sometimes regarded as a 'counterclaim in disguise'.38 The reason for this 
similarity is that both set-off and counterclaim are meant to avoid circuity of action. 
The outcome of a counterclaim, the order of a 'net' judgment between the parties, 
is also similar to that of a set-off. In fact, even the motives of defendants raising a 
counterclaim are similar to those of raising a set-off. A counterclaim will often be 
31
 Derham, supra n. 1, at pp. 20 et seq.; Wood, supra n. 14, No. 43-4; see ayso Hoffman LJ in The 'New 
Vanguard', supra n. 27, at p. 195. 
See The 'New Vanguard', supra n. 27, at p. 200 stating that 'transaction set-off encompasses both the 
common law abatement and equitable set-off. 
33
 See Derham, supra n. 1, at 57; Hanak v. Green [1958] 2 QB 9; The 'Kostas Melas' [1981] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 
18 at 26; Federal Commerce & Navigation Co. Ltd v. Molena Alpha Inc. [1978) 1 QB 927 at 982; for 
Australia see AWA Ltd v. Exicom Australia Pty Ltd [1990] NSWLR 705 at 711. 
34
 The Angelic Grace [1981] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 288; British Anzani (Felixstowe) Ltd v. International Marine 
Management (UK) Ltd [19801 1 QB 137; National Westminster Bank pic v. Skelton [19931 1 WLR 72 at 
76; see also Henriksens Reederei A/Sv. THZ Rolimpex (The Brede) [1974] QB 233; Derham, supra n. 1 
at p. 71 (' . . . opinions which seem to indicate the contrary should not be regarded as representing the true 
position'); hut see Poudret, supra n. 2, at p. 382, stating that 'transaction set-off refers to set-off of claims 
arising out of the same contract. 
See Derham, supra n. 1, at p. 57 on one side and Wood, supra n. 14, Nos. 4-25, 11-24, 14-56 on the 
other. 
36
 Wood, supra n. 14, No. 1-37 in fine; cf. already Savignv, System des heutigen Romischen Rechts, Vol. 5 
(1847) at p. 335. 
37
 See infra VIII. 
Habscheid, 'Das schweizerische Schiedskonkordat, der Entwurf zu einem Bundesgesetz iiber das 
Internationale Privatrecht und die Internationale Schiedgsgerichtsbarkeif in Festschrift Nagel (1987) at pp. 
70, 80; cf. also Huplein-Stich, Das UNCITRAL-Modellgesetz iiber die Internationale Handelsschieds-
gerkhtsbarkeit (1990) at p. 123. 
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raised merely because certain prerequisites for a set-off under the applicable law 
are not fulfilled. Also, the counterclaim is frequently used as a delaying tactic in 
international economic arbitration39 or as a retaliatory device.40 Sometimes, the 
defendant even misuses an ostensible counterclaim as a disguised response to 
the claim.41 
In some jurisdictions, counterclaim and set-off are closely intertwined. This 
applies, e.g., to the 'compensation judiciaire' of French law. This institution is a 
procedural means provided for in Article 70 of the French Nouveau Code de 
Procedure Civil. A claim which the debtor raises in a counterclaim ('demande 
reconventionnelle en compensation') because the requirements of the 'compensa-
tion legale' under Articles 1289 er seq. of the French Code Civil are not met, is 
transformed by the judge into a claim which is eligible for set-off against the claim 
raised by the claimant.42 Contrary to the 'compensation legale', the judge enjoys 
discretion to grant the compensation. Usually, he will declare the set-off if he 
considers it necessary for the protection of the respondent.43 Swiss counsel from 
French-speaking cantons sometimes introduce this procedural notion of set-off in 
international arbitrations when they follow the approach known from their 
Cantonal procedural law and name their set-off defence, irrespective of the 
applicable law, 'claim for set-off. 
It was due to this intrinsic functional similarity of both institutions that the 
drafters of the UNCITRAL Model Law assumed that a respondent, raising 
the plea of set-off, has to state the facts supporting this defence in the same manner 
as he would have to support a counterclaim.44 The same applies under Articles 
19(4), 18(2) of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules and Article 42(c) of the W I P O 
Arbitration Rules. 
In spite of these similarities, set-off and counterclaim have to be distinguished 
sharply from each other.45 The European Court of Justice has emphasized this 
distinction in a recent decision concerning the interpretation of Article 6 No. 3 of 
" Szasz, 'Arbitration Rules and Practices of Institutions' in (1991) ICCA Congress ser. No. .5 (ed. van den 
Berg) at pp. 38, 42. 
40
 Ulmer, 'Winning the Opening Stages of an ICC-Arbitration' in (1991) 8 / . Int'l Arb. at pp. 33, 42, pointing 
out that in complex construction cases it is almost always possible for the respondent to state some sort of 
counterclaim ('Many defendants insist on filing a counterclaim based on the cliche assumptions that: "we 
have to have somediing to bargain away" and the arbitrators always "cut the baby in half".'). 
Fletcher, 'Unrealised Expectations - The Root of Procedural Confusion in International Arbitrations' in 
(1988) 4 Arbitration International 1 at pp. 40, 42. 
See Terre, Siruler and Lequette, supra n. 19, at p. 986: 'Le role du juge est alors de parfaire les caracteres 
de cette creance, afin de rendre la compensation possible.' 
See Benabent, Droit Civil, Les Obligations (199.5, 5th ed.) at p. 423; cf. generally for the origin of set-off in 
the notion of good faith supra 11(b). 
44
 See UN Doc. A/CN.9/264, Art. 23, para. 7 in Fine. 
But see Hupiein-Stich, supra n. 38, at p. 122, speaking of 'set-off through counterclaim' ('Aufrechnung 
durch Widerklage'). 
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the Brussels Judgments Convention.46 A counterclaim ('demande reconventio-
nelle', 'Widerklage') is a procedural instrument to raise an independent sub-
stantive claim, i.e. a means for the respondent to take the initiative and attack the 
claimant in order to obtain a separate judgment.47 Thus, a successful counterclaim 
may result in two judgments, i.e. a judgment for the claimant on his claim and a 
judgment for the respondent on his counterclaim.48 It is for this reason that the 
UNCITRAL Model Law provides in Article 2(f) that the provisions of the Law 
apply mutatis mutandis to a counterclaim.49 Thus, the respondent, who intends to 
raise a counterclaim, is subject to the general rules relating to the presentation and 
amendment viz. supplementation of the claim. 
An important distinction also has to be drawn between set-off and counterclaim 
when the claim is withdrawn. In this case, the tribunal remains competent for the 
decision on the counterclaim50 which takes on a life of its own.51 
Set-off, whether of a substantive or a procedural quality, is not a device to attack 
but a mere defence of the respondent against the claimant's claim.52 It can be used 
only 'as a shield, not as a sword'.53 A set-off may also be declared by the claimant 
as a defence against a counterclaim raised by the respondent,54 provided that the 
tribunal has ascertained mat the respondent has in fact raised a counterclaim and 
not merely a set-off. Contrary to a counterclaim, the respondent can recover 
nothing for himself. The arbitrator, therefore, need not make the set-off the 
subject of a separate decision in his award.55 The viability of mis defence always 
remains dependent on the main claim throughout the life of the arbitration. If, 
therefore, the arbitral tribunal determines during the arbitral proceedings that the 
46
 Danvxm Production A/S v. Schuhfabriken Otterbeck GmbH & Co., C-34.1/93, in (1997) Praxis des 
Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts (IPRax) at p. 114; see also Philip, 'Set-offs and Counterclaims 
under the Brussels Judgments Convention', in (1997) IPRax at pp. 97 et seq.; cf. also Coester-Waltjen, 'Die 
Aufrechnung im internationalen ZivilprozePrecht' in Festschrift Luke (1983) at pp. 35, 46. 
47
 See Cockburn CJ in Stooke v. Taylor [1880] 5 QB 569 at 576: ' . . . the most striking difference is mat the 
counterclaim operates not merely as a defence, as does the set-off, but in all respects as an independent 
action by the defendant against the plaintiff. To the extent to which the damages accruing to the defendant 
on the counterclaim may be in excess of those accruing to the plaintiff on his claim, the defendant becomes 
entitled to judgement ... '; cf. also Derham, supra n. 1, at p. 2; Soderlund, 'Verfahrensfragen im Rahmen 
der internationalen Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit' in (1997) Betriebs-Berater, Supplement No. 13, at pp. 18, 24. 
48
 Derham, ibid.; see also ICC Award No. 5946, reprinted in Collection of ICC Arbitral Awards (eds 
Arnaldez, Derains and Hascher) (1997) at pp. 46, 65: 'Accordingly, the respondent's claim for set-off must 
be denied. This results in the Sole Arbitrator's obligation of awarding separately to the claimant the 
purchase price and to the respondent the damages for lost profit' 
49
 cf. UN Doc. A/CN.9/246, para. 196; A/CN.9/264, Art. 16, B., para. 5, n. 54. 
Provided that the counterclaim is within the scope of the arbitration agreement, see for this problem that 
applies to both set-off and counterclaim infra V(a)(i). 
51
 Sanders, 'Commentaries on UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules' in (1997) Yearbook Commercial Arbitration at 
p. 205; cf. also Iran-US Claims Tribunal, Computer Sciences Corporation v. The Government of die 
Islamic Republic of Iran [1986] 10 Iran-US CTR 269 at 312. 
52
 See Hoffman LJ in Stein v. Blake [1995] 2 All ER 961 at 966, stating that set-off under the Statutes 'can be 
invoked only by filing of a defence in an action'. 
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claimant's claim is outside the scope of the arbitration agreement, there is no set-
off.56 The claimant may proceed to pursue his claim before the courts which then 
have to decide whether a set-off with a cross-claim that is subject to an arbitration 
agreement may be admitted.'57 Also, the cross-claim on which the set-off is based is 
involved in the arbitration only insofar as it does not exceed the amount of the 
main claim58 while the counterclaim, being a claim of its own, is not subject to such 
a limitation.59 
IV. APPLICABLE L A W 
Not infrequently, the various laws that may have a bearing on the determination of 
the admissibility of set-off in international economic arbitration are insufficiently 
distinguished from each other. Sometimes, the reason for this negligent treatment 
of the conflict of laws problem is caused by a confusion about what 'admissibility of 
the set-off really means. It may refer to the viability of the defence itself, which has 
to be determined under its own applicable law (b). However, this question may 
only be dealt with by the arbitrators once the procedural admissibility of the 
defence has been ascertained.60 Thus, the first issue is whether the party invoking 
the set-off is allowed to introduce this defence into the arbitral proceedings (a). If 
this question cannot be answered in the affirmative, there is no room for an 
investigation into the justification of the set-off defence under the law applicable 
to it. 
(a) The Law Applicable to the Procedural Admissibility of the Set-Off Defence 
The procedural admissibility of the set-off defence may be determined from two 
different angles. 
The first angle finds a parallel in proceedings before domestic courts where the 
procedural admissibility of the set-off is governed by the 'lex fori'.61 In the absence 
of a lex fori of international arbitral tribunals, the arbitrators have to decide this 
issue with reference to the applicable arbitration law, the 'lex loci arbitrf.62 Since 
most arbitration laws today follow the territorial theory, this will almost always be 
the arbitration law in force at the seat of the arbitration and the legal doctrine 
developed in that jurisdiction. If and to the extent that this law leaves room for 
,6
 Mustill and Boyd, supra n. 11, at p. 130. 
'" See infra VII. 
58
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US Claims Tribunal' in (1989) 23 G. Wash.JInt'l L & Ec. at p. 286; cf. also Savigny, supra n. 36, at p. 336. 
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party autonomy, the arbitral tribunal will also have to look at the agreements of the 
parties, including arbitration rules which were referred to in the arbitration 
clause.63 
The second angle relates to the scope and interpretation of the arbitration 
agreement. In certain cases to be discussed below,64 the admissibility of the set-off 
may depend on the question whether the parties have expressly or impliedly 
extended the scope of the arbitration agreement to the cross-claim on which the 
set-off is based. This agreement may have been made already in the initial contract 
or later during the arbitration proceedings. In all of these cases the arbitrators have 
to determine the scope of the arbitration agreement according to the law 
applicable to it.65 If the parties have not made a choice of law relating to the 
arbitration agreement, Article 178(2) of the Swiss Statute on Private International 
Law (SPIL) refers the arbitrator to the law governing the subject matter of the 
dispute or to Swiss law. Article V(l)(a) of the New York Convention also refers to 
the law of the seat of the arbitration if the parties have not made a choice of law. It 
is often overlooked that it is not only the arbitration agreement covering the claim 
but also the (possibly different) arbitration agreement covering the cross-claim and 
the law applicable to it which has a decisive influence on the determination of the 
admissibility of the set-off defence.66 
Article 178(2) of the Swiss SPIL provides an important indication for the 
general thrust of the interpretation of the arbitration agreement. The provision 
reflects the general principle of 'in favorem validitatis', which strives to uphold the 
validity of the arbitration agreement as much as possible, thereby preserving 
the overall efficiency of the arbitral process.67 
(b) The Law Governing the Determination of the Merits of the Set-Off Defence 
Once the procedural admissibility of the set-off has been affirmed by the 
arbitrators, they may proceed to determine the merits of the plea, including the 
existence of the cross-claim. In the majority of cases, international arbitrators will 
not follow a transnational approach68 but will determine the applicable law 
'' Honsell, Vogt, Schnyder and Wenger, ibid. 
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according to classical conflict of laws principles. The question of the law applicable 
to a set-off defence is one of the most discussed issues of conflict of laws. 
According to the prevailing opinion in European conflict of laws doctrine, set-off is 
governed by the law of the claim which the debtor asserts has been discharged by 
the set-off.69 The reasoning behind this rule is that the issue of whether a party is 
discharged from its obligation is governed by the proper law of the contract out of 
which this obligation arises.70 This view is confirmed by Article 148(2) of the Swiss 
SPIL which provides that the law applicable to set-off is 'that governing the right 
against which set-off is asserted. Similarly, Article 10(l)(d) of the Rome Convention 
on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations of 19 June 1980 provides that 
the proper law of the contract also applies to 'the various ways of extinguishing 
obligations . . . ' . It is generally agreed that this provision also applies to set-off.71 
The problem with this conflict of laws approach is that it takes the perspective of 
die party that declares the set-off. In those rare cases where claim and cross-claim 
are governed by different laws, the question of the validity of the plea of set-off may 
depend upon who raises it first.72 This rule applies even in those cases where the 
law so determined qualifies set-off as an element of procedural law.73 
In France74 and Belgium,75 a different approach is favoured to determine the 
law applicable to the 'compensation legale'. According to the 'cumulative theory', 
die set-off is justified only if the laws applicable both to the debtor's and to the 
creditor's claim declare set-off admissible. Obviously, this view is a result of the ex 
lege effect of the 'compensation legale', which does not require a declaration by 
cont. 
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one of the parties. As a consequence of this ex lege effect the 'compensation 
legale' is of a neutral character76 in that it does not serve the interests of one or 
other party.77 Frequently, this cumulative approach will also be followed by 
international arbitrators. They frequently refer to the conflict of laws principles of 
all jurisdictions concerned (the law of the claimant, the law of the respondent and 
the law of the seat of the arbitration) in order to attach more persuasiveness to 
their decision on the law applicable to the merits.78 Thus, the approach is not 
dictated by law but applied for practical purposes. 
V. P R O C E D U R A L ADMISSIBILITY OF SET-OFF 
In determining the procedural admissibility of a set-off defence, international 
arbitrators may be confronted with two different scenarios. In the first scenario, the 
cross-claim on which the set-off is based is subject to the same arbitration 
agreement (a). In the second scenario, the cross-claim is subject to a different 
arbitration clause, a jurisdiction clause or is not governed by any forum selection 
clause (b). 
(a) Cross-claim Not Subject to a Jurisdiction or Different Arbitration Clause 
(i) The principle 
The basic procedural prerequisite79 of set-off in this scenario is derived from the 
consensual character of arbitration: the cross-claim has to be within the scope of 
the arbitration agreement.80 This is the most commonly encountered form of set-
off in practice.81 It is for this reason that Article 19(3) of the UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules provides that the respondent may rely on 'a claim arising out of 
the same contract for the purpose of a set-off'. The UNCITRAL Model Law does 
not contain such a provision. However, it was made clear during the deliberations 
of the Working Group that this restriction to the scope of the arbitration 
agreement 'is self-evident in view of the fact that the jurisdiction of the arbitral 
tribunal is based on, and given within the limits of, that agreement'.82 This basic 
See Berger, supra n. 1, at p. 70. 
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rule also prevents the respondent from enlarging the arbitrators' jurisdiction 
unilaterally simply by raising the defence of set-off. 
Consequendy, the set-off has to involve a claim concerning a 'dispute which has 
arisen out of or in connection with the contract' that contains the arbitration 
agreement. This wording covers not only contractual claims.83 Thus, from this 
procedural standpoint,84 the cross-claim can also be of a tortious nature. Under 
diese circumstances, the 'dispute' required by the traditional wording of the 
arbitration agreement exists even in those cases where the claimant's claim is 
undisputed but a set-off is raised by the respondent as a true defence, e.g. as an 
equitable or 'transaction' set-off under English law.85 It is for this reason that if the 
claimant brings an action before a domestic court, the respondent who raises a set-
off based on a cross-claim that falls within the scope of the arbitration agreement 
and constitutes a true defence, may apply to the court and have the legal 
proceedings stayed (section 9(1) of the English 1996 Arbitration Act), rejected as 
inadmissible (section 1032(1) of the new German Arbitration Law) or referred to 
arbitration (Article 8(1) UNCITRAL Model Law).86 
If the arbitration agreement does not cover the cross-claim, the parties may 
agree to extend the arbitration agreement.87 This procedure was suggested by the ar-
bitral tribunal but not followed by the parties in a partial award relating to the 
famous SOFIDIF case.88 An agreement to extend the scope of die arbitration 
agreement may be effected impliedly if the claimant does not object to the setting 
off of a cross-claim that lies outside the scope of the arbitration agreement.89 
However, it is most often overlooked that the claimant's procedural conduct may 
' See generally Berger, supra n. 67, at p. 124; cf. also the new wording of the ICC Standard Arbitration 
Clause (ICC Publ. No. .581, at p. 8) referring to disputes arising 'out of or in connection' with die contract 
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have such an important effect on the plane of substantive law. The parties may have 
agreed on contractual set-off, which is permissible under almost all laws of the 
world.90 
(ii) Cross-claims arising out of closely related contracts 
There are precedents in international case law where the respondent has based his 
set-off defence on a cross-claim that arose out of a contract closely related to the 
one in dispute. 
In an award rendered under the auspices of the Court of Arbitration at the 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry in Sofia in 1980,91 the arbitrators had to 
decide on a set-off plea that was based on a claim arising out of a loan agreement. 
This agreement had been concluded between the parties in order to finance the 
purchase under the sales contract which formed the subject of the dispute. The loan 
agreement did not contain any forum selection clause. The arbitrators did not 
hesitate to admit the set-off. They reasoned that 'the loan agreement could be 
regarded as a clause of the sales contract, albeit embodied by [sic\ a separate 
document'.92 The tribunal found further support in previous decisions of the 
Court of Appeals of Nuremberg and the German Federal Supreme Court 
rendered with respect to the contracts in dispute. Both courts had acknowledged 
mat due to the close link between the sales contract and the loan agreement, the 
arbitration agreement contained in the former extended to disputes arising out of 
the latter as well.93 
It is clear from the reasoning of the arbitrators that the extremely close 
connection between the contracts made it easy for the tribunal to confirm the 
admissibility of the set-off. Not infrequendy, the question arises in arbitral practice 
whether an arbitration agreement contained in one contract extends to related 
contracts.94 No general solution can be given for these cases. The answer always 
depends on the circumstances of the case, especially on the wording of the 
arbitration agreement in the main contract and on the attitude of the applicable law 
towards the interpretation of arbitration agreements. Thus, the model arbitration 
clause of the Netherlands Arbitration Institute (NAI) refers to arbitration 'all 
disputes arising in connection with the present contract and further contracts 
resulting thereof. This wording provides a perfect example for an extension of the 
arbitration agreement to related contracts even though the question remains when 
a contract 'results' from the main contract.95 In case of the usual standard 
Wood, supra n. 14, No. 24-43: 'Contractual set-off appears to be universally allowed where it would not 
otherwise be available'; see also Berger, supra n. 1, at pp. 84 et seq. 
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arbitration clause covering all disputes 'arising out of or in connection with the 
present contract', the answer depends on whether the close link between the main 
contract and the ancillary contract out of which the cross-claim arises justifies the 
assumption that the dispute over the cross-claim did in fact arise 'in connection' 
with the main contract that forms the subject of the arbitration. In England, the 
courts have given a surprisingly restrictive interpretation to this terminology.96 A 
close economic link justifying an extension of the arbitration agreement in 
exceptional cases may be assumed if a guarantee that does not contain an 
arbitration agreement serves as security for the performance of a main contract 
containing an arbitration clause.97 In the ICC Award No. 5971,98 the arbitrators 
referred to the award of the Sofia Chamber of Commerce as support for admitting 
a set-off based on a cross-claim arising from an 'equipment purchase contract'. In 
the eyes of the arbitrators, this contract was so closely related to the joint venture 
contract in dispute that both were characterized by the arbitrators as an 'ensemble 
economique' and 'ensemble legal in the sense that the purchase contract 
contained the details of the sales transactions mat were already envisaged in the 
joint venture agreement. There was, however, one important difference between 
this case and the award rendered by the tribunal in Sofia. In the ICC case, the 
purchase contract contained another arbitration clause referring to the rules of a 
different arbitral institution. As will be seen below,99 this adds a particular 
procedural coloration to the problem which prevents a solution that is based solely 
on the interpretation of the arbitration agreement of the main contract. 
(Hi) Possible decisions by the tribunal 
If the set-off is the only defence raised by respondent and the cross-claim is 
disputed and substantially lower than the main claim, the arbitral tribunal, in order 
to preserve the claimant's cash-flow, may decide, in a partial award, that such sum 
is payable to claimant as proves not to be in dispute after taking into account the ex-
tent of the cross-claim.100 This procedure was discussed extensively in the Interim 
Award relating to the SOFIDIF case and the ensuing decisions of the Swiss 
courts.101 According to English case law, a partial award on parts of the amount 
claimed can also be rendered if the party exercising its right of set-off cannot 
convince the tribunal that it has reasonable grounds for exercising this right and 
that it is acting in good faith.102 Since good faith is a general principle of law 
Mustill and Boyd, supra n. 11, at p. 87. 
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limiting the exercise of a party's rights,103 this approach could be taken by any 
arbitral tribunal provided that it is clear beyond doubt that the set-off violates good 
faith, e.g. is brought merely to delay and obstruct the proceedings. If, on the other 
hand, the cross-claim is substantially higher than the claim, an award in which the 
tribunal reserves its decision on the set-off for the final award is provisional and not 
enforceable.104 
Finally, if the success of the set-off is doubtful and requires complex and time-
consuming legal and factual investigations with respect to the cross-claim, the 
arbitral tribunal may take a pragmatic approach and render an interim award in 
favour of the claimant, requiring him to pay security in the amount of the cross-
claim until the decision on the set-off has been made.105 
(iv) The special case of late set-off 
Sometimes, international arbitrators have to cope with set-offs that are raised late 
in the arbitration. Sometimes, the set-off may be misused to delay or obstruct the 
proceedings.106 Here, the same principles apply that a tribunal has to take into 
account when evaluating the admissibility of a counterclaim. This parallel was 
acknowledged by the UNCITRAL Working Group during the deliberations of 
the Model Law.107 It is also reflected in Article 44 of the W I P O Arbitration Rules. 
Under most modern arbitration rules the tribunal may admit a later 
counterclaim in exceptional cases. Article 26 of the International Arbitration 
Rules of the Zurich Chamber of Commerce always requires the consent of the 
claimant which will rarely be obtainable by the respondent. 
When deciding on the admissibility of a plea of set-off, the tribunal has to take 
into consideration the procedural practicability of the simultaneous adjudication of 
claim and cross-claim, especially the delay of the proceedings and the procedural 
disadvantages for the claimant.108 Thus, the tribunal in ICC arbitration No. 3540, 
after having ascertained the transnational requirements of setoff,109 added the 
statement that 'it does not appear to the arbitral tribunal . . . that the claim of A 
' See Berger, supra n. 67, at pp. 217 et seq. 
See Henn, Schiedsverfahrensrecht (1991, 2nd ed.) at p. 178. 
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at the same time, me exact amount of a claim which it purports to have against the latter has not yet been 
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The arbitral tribunal (in the ICC Award No. 3540], aware of this difficulty, has adopted a practical approach 
in that it has decided that this payment may not be made unless accompanied by a guaranty.'); Reiner, supra 
n. 2, at p. 124; cf. also Derham, supra n. 1, at p. 4, n. 16. 
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[the party raising the plea of set-off] against B appears to be a purely dilatory means 
and is, prima facie, totally deprived of any foundation; consequently, the tribunal 
may in the course of the proceedings, direcdy proceed to determine the net sum of 
the claim'.110 If the delay in raising the plea of set-off is not excused by the 
respondent, the tribunal may refuse to deal with the late set-off unless this refusal 
might be considered as a violation of the respondent's right to be heard or his right 
to equal treatment. There will usually be no violation of such basic procedural 
rights if the respondent introduces the set-off shortly before, during or even after 
the oral hearing.111 The further the proceedings have advanced the higher are the 
standards for the admissibility of a late set-off.112 However, the tribunal's decision 
always has to be viewed against the idea of procedural economy, which is the 
guiding principle for both institutional and ad hoc arbitrations.113 Consequendy, 
the respondent has a chance to have a late set-off admitted if the tribunal does not 
have to evaluate new facts and evidence to decide on it. 
(b) Cross-claim Subject to a Jurisdiction or Different Arbitration Clause 
In the second procedural scenario, the cross-claim is subject to a jurisdiction clause 
or a different arbitration clause. In this scenario, the tribunal has to decide whether 
it has jurisdiction to deal with the cross-claim within the arbitration irrespective of 
its being subject to a different jurisdiction, or whether it has to follow the 
respondent's argument that the arbitrators must await the outcome of the dispute 
over the cross-claim in that other jurisdiction before they can decide on the set-off. 
(i) Article 29(1) of the Swiss Concordat 
Article 29(1) of the Swiss Concordat adopts the latter approach. It provides that 
'[w]here one of the parties pleads a set-off on the basis of a legal relationship for 
which the arbitral tribunal lacks jurisdiction under the terms of the arbitration 
agreement, and the parties do not agree to extend the arbitration to that legal 
relationship, the proceedings shall be stayed, and a reasonable time shall be 
allowed to the party making the exception to establish it before the court having 
jurisdiction.' 
This Article belongs to the most criticized provisions of the Concordat. It 
received particular attention in the SOFIDIF case. In one of the arbitrations 
arising out of this complex dispute and involving a claim of US$2bn, the 
respondent introduced a set-off based on an alleged cross-claim of US$400m that 
had been assigned to him and was subject to another ICC arbitration clause 
110
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111
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contained in a related contract.114 In view of the 'clear and plain language' of 
Article 29, the tribunal argued that 'bound by the mandatory character of Article 
29, [we] cannot do anything else than stay the proceedings and allow the defendant 
to establish its claim before the court with jurisdiction'. The respondent was 
granted a time limit of five months to comply with this award and to introduce the 
cross-claim before the competent court. The tribunal indicated that if the re-
spondent would not comply with the obligation imposed on him in the interim 
award, 'the consequence may be that the arbitral proceedings in the present case 
are continued without taking into account the plea of set-off'.115 
In a dissenting opinion, one of the arbitrators argued that the tribunal should 
have first ascertained whether there is a principal debt before deciding on the stay 
of the proceedings. In his view, Article 29 of the Concordat could not be regarded 
as providing for an automatic stay. Only if and to the extent that the main claim 
had been established could the tribunal order a stay or - in case the cross-claim has 
been fully established by that time - could consider the set-off. To justify his view, 
the arbitrator referred to the exceptional character and limited scope of the 
provision, which he regarded as a means of securing that the arbitral tribunal does 
not transgress its jurisdiction, and to the very nature of the set-off defence which 
serves to extinguish the main claim, thereby presupposing that such a claim exists. 
The arbitrator also argued that suspension should not have been granted because 
set-off was excluded in the contract out of which the principal claim arose. The 
contract clearly stipulated for the payment of the claim in US dollars, while the re-
spondent sought to set-off his cross-claim denominated in French francs.116 In this 
context, the dissenting arbitrator referred to the fact that set-off of claims in 
different currencies was also prohibited by the law applicable to the setoff.117 
Finally, the arbitrator touched upon the 'related contracts-test' described above.118 
He argued that the mere fact that there existed certain relations between the two 
contracts is not of itself sufficient reason to suspend the proceedings. Both 
arbitrations were clearly distinct as far as the composition of the arbitral tribunal, 
the rules applicable to the substance of the dispute and the place of arbitration 
were concerned. In addition he wrote, the two claims were of a different nature. 
The interim award was attacked by the claimant before the Cantonal Court of 
cf. generally for the effect of arbitral agreements in case of assignment of claims Girsberger and 
Hausmaninger, 'Assignment of Rights and Agreement to Arbitrate' in (1992) 8 Arbitration International 2 
r at pp. 121, 123 etseq. 
'' Interim Award No. 2 in ICC arbitration No. 5124 (Iran v. CEA), supra n. 88, at pp. 11 ef seq;, see Blessing, 
in Internationales Privatrecht (eds Honsell, Vogt and Schnyder) (1996) Introduction to the Twelfth 
Chapter, No. 1.52. 
' Agreement on a certain currency in the contract may be regarded as a prohibition of set-off under certain 
legal systems if this agreement does not merely serve to indicate me value of the claim but fixes the currency 
of payment, see for Swiss law Kleiner, Internationales Devisen-Schuldrecht (1985) No. 22.71. 
There is no uniform solution to this issue in the various legal systems; claims denominated in different 
currencies cannot be set off under German law while Swiss and Dutch law allow the set-off under these 
circumstances; see Berger, supra n. 1, at p. 253; Article 6: 129(3) Dutch Civil Code; Swiss Federal Tribunal 
BGE 63 II 383 et seq. 
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Geneva. The Court set aside the award for denial of justice under Article 36(d) 
and (f) of the Concordat."9 It stated that, prior to die suspension of the 
proceedings under Article 29 of the Concordat, flie tribunal should have ex-
amined whether the prerequisites of set-off were fulfilled under the applicable law. 
Even if mis question could have been answered in the affirmative by the 
arbitrators, die Court argued that 'in the interest of a good administration of 
justice' and in view of the 'flagrant disproportion' between the strong claim and the 
much weaker cross-claim introduced by the respondent, the arbitratorc should 
have suspended the proceedings only insofar as mat portion of the main claim was 
concerned mat could have been absorbed by die cross-claim. For the rest of the 
main claim, the tribunal should have continued the proceedings 'without delay'. 
This judgment was ultimately confirmed by the Swiss Federal Tribunal which 
pointed to die particular character of Article 29 of the Concordat, tending 'to 
favour abusive practices' and requiring a restrictive interpretation.120 
Two important general conclusions may be derived from die history of the 
interim award rendered in the SOFIDIF case. 
First, the complex issue of the treatment of set-off should be decided in an 
international arbitration only if and to the extent that it really matters, i.e. after the ex-
istence of the main claim and die admissibility of die plea of set-off under the law 
applicable to it121 have been ascertained by the arbitrators, including die absence of 
any contractual exclusion122 or legal prohibition of set-off. 
Secondly, the SOFIDIF case indicates the extreme problems that arbitral 
practice always had in balancing die respondent's right to set off cross-claims and 
die need to prevent abusive practices and to foster procedural justice under Article 
29 of die Concordat. Since die enactment of the 12tii Chapter of the Swiss SPIL 
this provision no longer applies to international arbitrations having their seat in 
Switzerland.123 In spite of suggestions to die contrary,124 it should not be taken as a 
model for solutions of die set-off problem in international arbitration. The 
provision confuses set-off, which can be dealt widi by die arbitral tribunal, and 
counterclaim, which, being an action of its own and not a mere defence, cannot be 
made subject to the competence of die arbitral tribunal widiout an extension of die 
arbitration agreement covering the claim.125 Also, experience with diis provision 
Cantonal Court of Geneva, decision of 19 December 1989. 
120
 Swiss Federal Tribunal of 17 May 1990, BGE 116 la 154; Blessing, supra n. 115, ihid.; see for a list of 
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has been very negative since it constitutes an invitation for delaying tactics based on 
a weak set-off defence.126 Prior to the entering into force of the SPIL parties to 
arbitrations in Switzerland have for this reason frequendy excluded this pro-
vision.127 Hence, the ICC Second Interim Award No. 5124 has righdy been 
characterized as a 'prime example' for the 'unfortunate structure' of Article 29 and 
of the Swiss Concordat as a whole.128 
After the SOFIDIF case, international arbitrators sitting in Switzerland have 
been very reluctant to apply Article 29. This restrictive approach is exemplified in 
ICC Award No. 5514. The respondent in that arbitration had argued that 
suspension of the proceedings under Article 29 of the Concordat would not only 
be required due to the 'ordre public' quality of that provision but would also be an 
equitable solution given that it would be 'morally and economically incompre-
hensible that he would have to pay the slightest sum to the claimant even though it 
was the creditor vis-a-vis the claimant of a much higher sum in another ar-
bitration'.129 With this statement, the respondent indirecdy referred to the 
historical roots of the set-off defence which lie in the 'dolo agit" principle of Roman 
law.130 The tribunal was not impressed by this. It refused to apply Article 29, 
referring to the fact that suspension would 'lead to substantial delays, however 
advantageous it would be to facilitate a global settlement of the parties' mutual 
debts'. 
(ii) The pragmatic approach 
Contrary to the controversial solution adopted by the drafters of die Concordat, 
there is a growing tendency to assume that, as a rule, an international arbitral 
tribunal has jurisdiction to hear a set-off defence based on a cross-claim that is 
subject to a different arbitration agreement or jurisdiction clause. This view applies 
only to those set-offs that have a substantive nature, e.g. the 'Aufrechnung' or 
'Verrechnung' under German or Swiss law, the 'compensation legale' under 
French law and the equitable or 'transaction' set-off under English law. Being a 
substantive defence which denies the existence of the claim, the set-off has the 
same quality as any otiier substantive defence. The tribunal should therefore be 
authorized to decide on all defences which are raised against the claim ('lejuge de 
Faction est lejuge de l'exception'131), and consequendy also on die merits of the 
1 6
 See Reiner, supra n. 2, at pp. 115 et seq.; cf. also Lalive, Poudret and Reymond, ibid., Article 29 
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set-off.132 Referring the cross-claim to adjudication before the domestic court is 
regarded as 'depriving the set-off of its efficiency, especially when regarded as an 
essentially dilatory means'.133 This solution is also advocated for equitable or 
'transaction' set-off raised in arbitrations having their seat in England.134 The 
general thrust behind this approach is of a highly practical nature. It is said to avoid 
'overly formalistic'135 solutions and thereby preserve the procedural economy of 
the arbitration. For this very reason, the simultaneous adjudication of claim and 
cross-claim via the set-off defence is alleged to be in the presumed interest of the 
parties to the arbitration: 
It is not surprising in commercial life that a party is confronted with a cross-claim that arises out 
of a different legal relationship and a party to an arbitration agreement must take account of this 
fact. In the eyes of the parties to a standard arbitration agreement, the parties' interest to have 
claim and cross-claim decided simultaneously and through one single instance outweighs the 
interest to preserve a different competence for the cross-claim. 
If me cross-claim could not be considered by the tribunal in the context of the set-
off raised by the respondent, the claimant would receive an award in his favour 
even though a domestic court or different arbitral tribunal would subsequendy 
(perhaps years later if the court judgment is appealed) render a judgment in favour 
of the respondent on his cross-claim. This latter decision indicates that, had the set-
off been admitted immediately in the arbitration, the arbitral tribunal would have 
been able to take account of the substantive effects of the set-off, deciding that the 
claimant's claim has been extinguished by way of set-off with a valid cross-claim.137 
The arbitral tribunal's competence to decide on die set-off would therefore avoid 
conflicting results with respect to the procedural (i.e. arbitral) inadmissibility of the 
set-off defence on one side and the effectiveness of the set-off on the plane of 
substantive law on the other.138 Thus, based on the presumed interests of the 
parties, this view establishes a presumption that international arbitral tribunals are 
competent to hear set-off defences that arise out of contracts which contain a 
different arbitration or jurisdiction clause. 'Clear indications' are required for the 
'exceptional case' that the parties intended to exclude the tribunal's competence 
'' Reiner, supra n. 2, at p. 119; Poudret, supra n. 2, at pp. 371 and 373 (for the Concordat) and 378 (for the 
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over such cross-claims.139 Such an exceptional case is assumed if the parties to the 
arbitration have agreed to have their case decided in a 'fast track' procedure or if 
the cross-claim is subject to an arbitration agreement that refers to highly 
specialized arbitration rules such as those of a maritime arbitral institution.140 
(Hi) The antinomy of conflicting forum selection clauses 
Taking a purely pragmatic approach to this problem neglects the will of the parties 
as expressed in the arbitration or other forum selection clause covering the cross-
claim.141 In those cases where it establishes the presumption in favour of the 
international arbitrator's competence over cross-claims outside the tribunal's 
jurisdiction, it treats the set-off as if it were subject to the same arbitration 
agreement as the main claim. It tackles the problem at the very end of the process, 
the achievement of procedural economy in the arbitration in case the set-off is 
raised as a defence. Instead of treating the efficiency of the arbitration as a 
procedural value in and of itself, one should look at the very beginning, i.e. the 
meaning and doctrinal significance of the different forum clause covering the cross-
claim. Even those who favour the simultaneous adjudication of claim and cross-claim 
by international arbitrators in this procedural scenario concede that there is no 
clear-cut rule in favour or against the admissibility of set-off. Instead, the arbitrators 
have to determine the will of the parties at the moment of conclusion of the 
arbitration agreement covering the main claim on the one side and the different 
forum clause covering the cross-claim on the other.142 From this ex ante 
perspective, both the consensual character of arbitration and the function and 
nature of forum selection clauses put into question the admissibility of set-off in 
international arbitrations.143 
First, set-off is frequently the only defence available to the respondent. This 
means that, if the main claim is undisputed, the arbitrators have to decide only on 
the cross-claim which in fact was outside the scope of the arbitration agreement.144 
Secondly and more importantly, the will of the parties as expressed both in the 
arbitration agreement that underlies the arbitration and in the jurisdiction or 
139
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different arbitration clause that covers the cross-claim usually prevents the 
assumption that the tribunal is competent to hear such set-off defences. 
When concluding the arbitration clause on which the arbitral proceedings are 
based, the parties intended to have those and only those claims decided by the ar-
bitral tribunal which fall under the scope of the arbitration agreement.145 In the 
absence of a clear indication to the contrary, it is only under this condition that 
the parties accept the formula 'lejuge de faction estlejuge de fexception'. The prin-
ciple of 'in favorem validitatis' which governs the interpretation of the arbitration 
agreement146 operates only within the limits set by these intentions of the parties. 
To extend the proceedings beyond the arbitration agreement without any 
indication as to a corresponding will of the parties would be against the parties' 
original intentions.147 This view has been confirmed by the German legislature in 
the travaux preparatoires of the new Arbitration Act: 
If the cross-claim is not covered by the arbitration agreement, the plea of set-off may only be 
raised if an extension of the arbitration agreement can be assumed because the claimant does 
not put into question the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal.148 
This view is in line with the case law of the Iran-US Claims Tribunal, which has 
repeatedly emphasized that, despite its distinct procedural nature,149 set-off has to 
meet the same jurisdictional standards as counterclaim, meaning that the cross-
claim has to be within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.150 
The effect of this limited scope of the arbitration agreement becomes clear 
when looking at a case which appears to be the least problematic: an arbitration in 
which the respondent introduces a cross-claim arising out of another contract 
between the same parties containing the same arbitration clause and referring to 
the same arbitration rules. Even though one would be tempted to allow the set-off 
in this case where the parties have chosen the same jurisdiction for claim and 
cross-claim, this would contravene the interest of the parties as expressed in the 
two arbitration agreements. It would mean to reintroduce consolidation of arbitral 
procedures through the back-door of the set-off defence. Section 35(2) of the 
English 1996 Arbitration Act expresses a general principle of international 
arbitration law151 according to which the tribunal has no power to order con-
solidation of proceedings or concurrent hearings unless agreed upon by the 
parties. Allowing the set-off in this case might favour the party who sues first, 
" See Schlosser, supra n. 19, No. 399. 
' See supra TV (a) in tine. 
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allowing it to determine the timing of the proceedings and to influence the general 
shape of the arbitral procedure. The SOFIDIF case mentioned above illustrates 
these problems. It involved two ICC arbitrations dealing with related contracts. It 
has been rightly emphasized that 'only the will of the parties expressed in the 
careful drafting of the arbitration agreements included in the various contracts 
might have avoided the difficulties which this affair illustrates'.1-52 This statement, 
made in the context of multiparty arbitration, applies equally to the problem of set-
off of claims that were subject to these arbitration agreements. 
The same reasoning applies to a cross-claim that is subject to a different 
arbitration agreement.153 It does not matter whether the parties have chosen a 
specialized arbitral institution for that claim or not.154 Every arbitral institution is 
chosen for some particular geographical, personal, technical or legal reason. 
Irrespective of how these reasons are assessed by outsiders, the arbitration 
agreement expresses the clear will of the parties to have claims arising out of that 
contract adjudicated under the auspices of a certain arbitral institution. The point 
has been made with respect to the NAI model arbitration agreement155 in cases 
where a 'resulting contract' provides for another manner of resolving disputes (e.g. 
ad hoc arbitration or another institutional clause). It has been doubted that under 
these circumstances, a dispute arising out of the 'resulting contact' could be 
arbitrated under the NAI rules.156 Why then should the respondent in the NAI 
arbitration be allowed to introduce the cross-claim arising out of that 'resulting 
contract' through a set-off defence? Party autonomy has the same principal value 
immaterial of whether one is dealing with an ongoing arbitration or an arbitration 
agreement that covers a cross-claim which the respondent would like to introduce 
into the arbitration via a set-off defence and which the arbitrators would like to 
admit for reasons of procedural economy. 
Aspects of procedural economy in the ongoing arbitration may therefore take 
priority over the parties' will as expressed in the arbitration agreement covering the 
cross-claim only in those exceptional cases where the claimant clearly indicates a 
corresponding will. In the absence of such an intention, even the close economic 
link between the two contracts may not serve as an argument to supervene the will 
of the parties as expressed in the other arbitration agreement.157 
When the cross-claim is not subject to another arbitration agreement but to a 
jurisdiction clause and the claimant opposes the tribunal's competence to hear the 
set-off, one has to take account not only of the parties' intentions that underlie 
152
 Gaillard, supra n. 88, at p. 291. 
See the Award of the Royal Ass. of the Committee of Grain Traders of 13 March 1984 in (1985) Yearbook 
Commercial Arbitration at pp. 79 er seq. 
15i
 See supra n. 140. 
' ' See supra n. 95. 
See Craig, Park and Paulsson, supra n. 78, at p. 110, n. 7; Berger, supra n. 67, at p. 123. 
157
 But see the ICC Award No. 5971 in (1995) 13 ASA Bulletin at pp. 728 ef seq., where the tribunal used this 
argument to admit the set-off based on a cross-claim that was subject to a different institutional arbitration 
agreement. 
Set-Off in International Economic Arbitration 77 
the arbitration agreement but also of their will as expressed in the other forum 
selection clause. In other words, the parties' interests expressed in the arbitration 
agreement do not stand alone. Rather, the vital interest of a party (i.e. the claimant) 
who has concluded a forum selection clause not to be taken before a foreign 
forum to which it has not agreed makes it clear that the tribunal's competence in 
these cases cannot be based on an isolated interpretation of the arbitration 
agreement. These interests form the basis of every forum selection clause. They 
outweigh any considerations of procedural economy in the arbitral proceedings. 
The American Supreme Court has frequently emphasized the special value of 
forum selection clauses in international trade.158 This protective function cannot 
be frustrated by a unilateral extension of the arbitrators' jurisdiction which is based 
on purely economical criteria.159 The claimant cannot be presumed to strive for 
procedural economy at all costs, i.e. even against his own clear will expressed in 
the forum selection clause that governs the cross-claim. The same is true if the 
claimant's general conditions of contract allow him to apply either to a municipal 
court or to an arbitral tribunal in a dispute concerning the set-off claim.160 The 
German Federal Supreme Court has provided the doctrinal underpinning for this 
view: in all of these cases the teleological interpretation of the arbitration or forum 
selection clauses that cover the cross-claim leads to a contractual exclusion of set-
off which causes the procedural inadmissibility of the set-off irrespective of which 
substantive law applies to it.161 
The underlying rationale of this view also sets the limits to this principle of the 
non-admissibility of the set-off defence in this procedural scenario. 
First, set-off is admissible irrespective of a jurisdiction or different arbitration 
clause if the cross-claim is undisputed or has already been ascertained with 'res 
iudicata' effect in that other jurisdiction. In these cases the above considerations 
relating to the interests of the parties as expressed in the arbitration agreement and 
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the value and the protective effect of forum selection clauses in international trade 
do not apply from the outset.162 
A second exception applies if die claimant who objects to the procedural 
admissibility of the set-off during the arbitration has not reacted to the 
respondent's announcement of his intention to raise the plea of set-off in his 
response to the statement of claim. Arguing against the admissibility of the set-off 
on jurisdictional grounds subsequently during the arbitration would violate the 
general principle of 'venire contra factum proprium'.163 
Finally, a third exception applies if the parties have granted the arbitrators the 
competence to decide on set-offs that are not subject to the arbitration agreement, 
thereby indicating that the competence of the arbitrators shall take priority over 
any other forum selection clause covering possible cross-claims. Such an agree-
ment may be assumed if the parties have agreed that claims arising out of the main 
contract shall be arbitrated under the auspices of the Zurich Chamber of 
Commerce. Article 27 of the International Arbitration Rules of the Zurich 
Chamber of Commerce provides that the tribunal has jurisdiction over a set-off 
even if another arbitration clause or jurisdiction clause for that claim exists. 
Agreement on the Zurich International Arbitration Rules must therefore be 
regarded as an agreement of the parties to the main arbitration agreement to 
extend the jurisdiction of the tribunal to cross-claims that are subject to another 
arbitration or jurisdiction clause.164 In this case, the claimant waives in advance the 
protection he enjoys under these clauses. 
It must be borne in mind, though, that contrary to some views described 
above,165 the general rule developed here is that the tribunal has no jurisdiction to 
hear set-off defences that are subject to jurisdiction or different arbitration clauses 
unless there are 'clear indications' for the 'exceptional case' that the tribunal's 
jurisdiction is extended by agreement of the parties to the cross-claim that would 
otherwise fall outside the arbitrator's competence. 
VI. ARBITRAL PRACTICE 
According to the above considerations, the arbitrators will not rule on the set-off 
claims unless the parties agree on an extension of the arbitration agreement. The 
respondent may pursue his cross-claim against the claimant in the other 
Schlosser, ibid., No. 399; Schiitze, Tscherning and Wais, supra n. 144, No. 55 ('To deny the tribunal's 
competence in this case would violate good faith'); Raeschke-Kessler, Berger and Lehne, ibid., No. 369; 
Berger, supra n. 67, at p. 465; Heini, Keller, Siehr, Vischer, Volken and Vischer, supra n. 6,5, Article 182, 
No. 13. 
163
 See Berger, supra n. 142, at p. 328 with n. 466. 
' See Honsell, Vogt, Schnyder and Wenger, supra n. 62, Article 186, No. 27; see also Article 12 of the new 
Lugano Arbitration Rules. 
'' See supra (ii). 
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jurisdiction. This procedure will have no effect on the arbitration166 unless there is 
a decision on die cross-claim assuming 'res iudicata' effect during the course of die 
arbitral procedure so that die arbitral tribunal may take account of this decision in 
its final award.167 If the respondent does not pursue his claim while die arbitration 
is pending, the arbitral tribunal may take the approach followed by die arbitrators 
in the ICC Award No. 3540.168 It may render an award in favour of the claimant, 
but order die claimant to pay security into an escrow account in the amount of die 
cross-claim if he seeks to enforce the award. At the same time, the tribunal should 
set a deadline for die respondent to pursue his cross-claim in the other jurisdiction 
in order to prevent him from blocking die enforcement process through a set-
off in bad faitii. Upon expiry of the deadline, die claimant should be allowed to 
take back die security. 
The award rendered could be considered 'final' under the enforcement system of 
die New York Convention. This approach therefore avoids die problems connected 
with proposals in German legal doctrine,169 that die arbitral tribunal should render 
a provisional award (' Vorbehaltsschiedsspruch') according to section 302(1) of die 
German Code of Civil Procedure subject to die final determination of the cross-
claim and set-off by die competent court or arbitral tribunal. 
If the tribunal does not adopt diis pragmatic approach, the substantive effect of 
the set-off has to be dealt with in subsequent enforcement procedures, provided 
that die law of the forum where enforcement is sought allows to take account of die 
set-off. If die claimant wants to avoid diese uncertainties altogether, he may agree 
to have the arbitration clause extended to the cross-claim, which, of course, does 
not imply any concession as to me substantive viability of die set-off plea which will 
tiien be determined by die arbitrators. 
VII. SET-OFF BEFORE D O M E S T I C C O U R T S 
The basic requirement diat die cross-claim on which the set-off is based must be 
covered by die arbitration agreement170 has a reverse effect before a domestic 
court if die defendant pleads a set-off based on a claim diat is subject to an 
arbitration agreement. It is argued diat die court should be competent to deal with 
die set-off since 'it would emasculate die right of set-off if die Courts were to say to 
the defendant "Pay up now and arbitrate later'".171 However, the recognition of 
" See Lalive, Poudret and Reymond, supra n. 12.5, article 186, No. 8 in fine. 
See supra V(b)(iii). 
.See supra n. 1. 
J
 See Schwab and Walter, supra n. 132, at p. 24; Schiitze, Tscherning and Wais, supra n. 144, No. .55; Henn, 
Schiedsverfahrensrecht (1991, 2nd ed.) at pp. 177 ef seq. 
See supra V(a)(i). 
The 'New Vanguard', supra n. 27, at 200 (for equitable set-off of English law), stating that '[t]his is a difficult 
point on which there is no authority', ibid, at p, 199; Reiner, supra n. 2, at p. 122; Poudret, supra n. 2, at 
p. 373, referring to a decision of the Cantonal Court of Vaud in 1913 III Journal des Tribunaux at p. 2; 
Austrian Federal Supreme Court, EvBI. 1991/44. 
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different jurisdictions for the main and the cross-claim should also apply in this 
situation.172 Again, the arbitration clause expresses the will of the parties to submit 
disputes to arbitration and to avoid every action that would contravene this 
intention of the parties.173 The arbitration agreement is said to contain an implied 
agreement to the effect that the question whether the claim exists and is valid will 
be determined only by the arbitral tribunal.174 The idea behind this reasoning is 
that no one can evade the binding force of an arbitration agreement, not even 
through a unilateral declaration, i.e. the plea of set-off.175 The principle of 
attaching maximum validity to an international arbitration agreement ('in favorem 
validitatis') which has become so prominent in international arbitral doctrine and 
practice176 cannot be circumvented by raising claims that are subject to such an 
agreement before the domestic courts by virtue of a plea of set-off. 
VII I . C O S T S O F SET-OFF 
A set-off may have repercussions on the advance of costs that have to be paid by 
the parties under the applicable arbitration rules. Thus, Article 30(5) of the new 
ICC Rules of Arbitration and its predecessor, Article 16 of the 'Internal Rules of 
the ICC Court of International Arbitration' (Appendix II)177 both provide that a 
set-off raised by one of the parties to the arbitration 'shall be taken into account in 
determining the advance to cover the costs of arbitration in the same way as a 
separate claim, insofar as it may require the Arbitral Tribunal to consider 
additional matters'. In practice this usually leads to an increase of the overall 
advance on costs. Under the old ICC Rules,178 problems arose in several 
arbitrations in which the respondent introduced a claim for set-off exceeding the 
amount of the claim, but did not pay its share of the increased advance of costs. In 
these cases the arbitrators were faced with the question whether they were allowed 
172
 See the German Federal Supreme Court in BGHZ 38, 254, 258; OLG Diisseldorf in (1983) Neue 
Juristische Wochenschrift at p. 2149; OLG Hamm in (1983) Recht der Internationalen Wirtschaft at pp. 
698, 699; BGE63 II133, 142; cf. a/so Wood, supran. 14, No. 12-50; Reithmann and Martiny, supra n. 61, 
No. 2498; Berger, supra n. 67, at p. 467; Raeschke-Kessler, Berger and Lehne, supra n. 161, No. 398. 
17J
 See the reasoning of the German Federal Supreme Court in BGHZ 38, 254, 258. 
Germand Federal Supreme Court, ibid. 
1
 ' See Schtitze, Tscherning and Wais, supra n. 144, No. 55. 
See, e.g., Article 4 of the Resolution 'L'arbitrage entre Etats et entreprises etrangeres', adopted at the 18th 
Session of the Institut de Droit International in Santiago de Compostela, 4-14 September 1989, printed in 
(1990) ICSID Review at pp. 139, 141. 
Article 16 has been deleted from the Annex and included (with a slighdy modified wording, thus die 
previous version required that the setoff 'is' taken into account) in the new Rules in effect as of 1 January 
1998 in the ICC's efforts to make the Rules more understandable and complete, see ICC Document No. 
420/350 of 8 October 1996, at p. 20. 
The problem is not eliminated with the new ICC Rules that have entered into force on 1 January 1998 since 
arbitrations pending on that date remain subject to the old rules on costs even if the parties have agreed to 
have the new ICC Arbitration Rules applied to their proceedings. 
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to deal with the set-off or whether the set-off was conditioned upon the payment of 
the advance on costs.179 
As in the case of cross-claims subject to a jurisdiction or different arbitration 
clause oudined above,180 the answer to this question requires a distinction between 
the substantive and the procedural plane. In jurisdictions such as Germany,181 the 
Netherlands182 and Switzerland,183 a declaration of set-off may not be made under 
a legal condition since the other party has a vital interest to know with certainty 
whether his claim has been extinguished through the unilateral declaration of set-
off or not. The provisions on the increase of the advance on costs in the ICC Rules 
do not interfere with this principle. They must be qualified as being of a purely 
procedural nature. In fact, reference to them in the arbitration clause can be 
regarded as a procedural agreement of the parties relating to the treatment of set-
off in case of a party's failure to pay the required advance on costs. By referring to 
the ICC Rules, the parties agree that the set-off shall only be entertained by the 
tribunal if the advance for the setoff has been paid. This follows from the interplay 
of Article 16 of the Internal Rules, providing that a set-off, for purposes of de-
termining the advance of costs, is to be treated as a separate claim and section 2(b) 
of the Appendix III (Schedule for Conciliation and Arbitration Costs), which 
provides that 'the submission of any claim to the arbirrator(s) shall be made only 
after at least half of the advance on costs . . . has been satisfied'.184 
The German Federal Supreme Court, in a long line of cases, has ruled mat, in 
die context of set-off, 'the parties may conclude procedural agreements in which 
one of the parties undertakes to comply with a certain procedural conduct . . . If 
that party introduces a remedy in violation of the agreed upon procedural conduct, 
it may not be heard with it in the legal proceedings'.185 This principle may also be 
applied to the advance on costs in case of set-off under the old ICC Rules of 
Conciliation and Arbitration.186 Consequently, if the advance is not paid by the 
respondent, the tribunal has no jurisdiction to deal with the set-off. As in the case 
of set-off with a claim that is subject to a jurisdiction or different arbitration 
' See Reiner, supra n. 2, at p. 114, n. 36. 
180
 See supra V(b)(i). 
See s. 388 2nd sentence of the German Civil Code ('The declaration of set-off is without effect if it is put 
under a legal condition or a stipulation of time'); cf. also Palandt and Heinrichs, Burgerliches Gesetzbuch 
(1988, 57th ed.) § 388, No. 1. 
182
 See Neiuwenhuis, Stalker and Valk, Burgerlijk Wetboek, Boeken 3, 5 en 6 (1994, 2nd ed.) Article 6: 127, 
No. 1 in fine. 
183
 See Honsell, Vogt, Wiegand and Peter, Obligationenrecht 1 (1996) Article 124, No. 3. 
184
 Article 9(3) of the ICC Rules of Conciliation and Arbitration deals only with the 'transmission of the file to 
the arbitrator'; it is therefore a purely technical rule relating to the internal procedure of the Secretariat and 
may not be taken as an indication for the agreed-upon effect of a party's failure to pay the advance on the 
tribunal's competence to entertain a plea of set-off. 
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 BGHZ 38, 254, 258 with reference to RGZ 160, 241 and BGH in (1953) Juristen-Zekung at p. 153. 
' cf. Reiner, supra n. 2, at p. 114, n. 3 6 : ' . . . fulfillment of the financial obligation [to pay the advance on costs 
fixed for the set-off] must be understood as an agreed-upon condition for the [procedural?] admissibility of 
the set-off (translation by the author). 
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clause,187 the set-off has to be dealt with in the ensuing enforcement procedures. 
The claimant may avoid these problems from the outset by paying the whole of the 
advance under Article 9(2) of the ICC Rules. 
Under the new ICC Rules of Arbitration the situation is not so clear. The 
general thrust of the new Rules to make the system for the payment of the ad-
vances on costs more transparent and more efficient has led to a relaxation of the 
effect of a party's failure to pay its advance on costs. Article 30(4) of the new Rules 
provides that '[w]hen a request for an advance on costs has not been complied 
with, the Secretary General may direct the Arbitral Tribunal to suspend its work 
and set a time limit, on the expiry of which the relevant claims . . . shall be 
considered as withdrawn'. It will be hard to take this as an indication for the 
parties' agreement on the procedural inadmissibility of set-off in case the party 
raising the plea has not paid the advance under Article 30(5) in connection with 
Article 30(3) of the new Rules. Rather, it must be assumed mat the arbitrators have 
the authority to deal with the set-off but that the parties have delegated the power 
to decide on the inadmissibility to the Secretary General. However, it must be 
borne in mind mat the Secretary General in these cases does not decide a legal 
issue that is reserved for the decision-making of the arbitrators. Rather, he merely 
renders an administrative decision leading to the withdrawal of the set-off by virtue 
of Article 30(4), a provision to the application of which the parties have agreed by 
referring to the ICC Rules of Arbitration. The problem remains, however, that 
under these circumstances, the arbitrators have to ignore the set-off even though 
the declaration of set-off during or prior to the arbitral procedure may have had 
led to the extinction of the claimant's claim on the plane of substantive law, which 
may cause problems in the enforcement stage. Again, the claimant may avoid this 
from the outset by paying the whole of the advance on costs pursuant to Article 
30(3) 3rd sentence of the new ICC Arbitration Rules. 
In spite of these considerations, the arbitrators in the ICC arbitrations 
mentioned above did not pursue the approach developed for the old ICC Rules. 
They found themselves unable, under the law applicable to the arbitration 
agreement, to interpret the provisions of the ICC Rules in the way just described. 
Instead, they dealt with the set-off defence introduced by the respondent even 
though the increased advance on costs was not paid by the respondent. They did 
this at their own expense, since they did not receive a higher fee even though the 
set-off required them 'to consider additional matters' as envisaged by Article 16 of 
the Internal Rules. However, it can be assumed that the arbitrators in these cases 
had no difficulty in realizing that the set-off defence was clearly unfounded so mat 
it was easier for them to avoid the intricacies of procedural and substantive law and 
enforcement problems in the post-award phase from the outset by deciding on the 
set-off defence. 
Only very few other arbitration rules contain provisions on the costs of set-off. 
l7
 See supra V(b)(i). 
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Thus, under Article 13 of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce Arbitration 
Rules, the Arbitration Institute of the Chamber may fix a separate advance for a 
plea by way of set-off. Under the International Arbitration Rules of the Zurich 
Chamber of Commerce, the value in dispute is increased by the amount of the set-
off if this defence relates to a non-connected claim.188 The rules of the WIPO, the 
DIS and the LCIA contain provisions on costs in case of counterclaims but do not 
deal with costs in case of set-off. 
IX. C O N C L U S I O N 
Set-off in international economic arbitration poses a variety of problems that range 
from balancing the parties' interests and basic procedural rights over the 
determination of cross-claims that do not fall within the jurisdiction of the arbitral 
tribunal and complicated problems of costs to complex issues of conflict of laws. 
In considering the procedural admissibility of set-off, the arbitrator often is 
confronted with the classical conflict of modern international arbitral procedure: 
balancing the parties' rights against the need for arbitral efficiency. The analysis of 
set-off with cross-claims that are subject to a jurisdiction or different arbitration 
clause and of set-off for which an increased advance of costs has not been paid has 
also revealed the basic dilemma of the law of set-off in the context of international 
arbitration: the conflict between the limited scope of the arbitration agreement and 
the inherent function of the set-off defence as a means for the global settlement 
of the debts outstanding between the parties. In these cases, international ar-
bitrators must first ascertain whether the circumstances of the case before them do 
in fact require a discussion of this complex issue: 
• Does the cross-claim really exist? 
• Are the requirements met that the applicable law imposes for the validity of 
the set-off defence? 
• Is the set-off excluded by express or implied agreement of the parties 
concluded in the initial contract or later or even during the arbitration? 
• Is the set-off excluded by the law applicable to the set-off? 
• Is the set-off excluded by the general principle of good faith, both on the 
plane of substantive and procedural law? 
• If the cross-claim has been assigned to the respondent, was this assignment 
effected in bad faith, preventing the set-off under the applicable law? 
• If the set-off defence is valid, can the scope of the arbitration agreement be 
extended to the cross-claim? 
• In case the contracts are 'closely related', does a hearing of the draftsmen of 
the arbitration agreement or jurisdiction clause covering the cross-claim 
Article 2.1 Schedule for Arbitration Costs, Zurich Chamber of Commerce International Arbitration Rules, 
reprinted in Berger, supra n. 67, at pp. 849, 853. 
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reveal that both parties did in fact intend to have the cross-claim 
adjudicated in the same forum as the main claim? 
For the remaining cases, the tribunal has to refuse to deal with the set-off for lack 
of jurisdiction over the cross-claim, knowing that the set-off has led to the 
extinction of claim and cross-claim on the plane of substantive law. This situation, 
however, is by no means limited to the arbitral process. German and English 
courts alike have long since acknowledged that the procedural aspects for invoking 
the set-off must be distinguished from the availability of set-off as a substantive 
defence.189 
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